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Political leaders, media and authoritarianism in Croatia: The Media 
Strikes Back? 
This study focuses on the media representation of political leaders in 
Croatia, the newest Member State of the European Union, with an aim to 
capture the extent to which and ways in which political leaders have been 
portrayed in the media in periods characterised with varying degrees of 
illiberalism. A longitudinal content analysis of three daily newspapers from 
1990 to 2018 reveals that in spite of the fact that media freedom decreased 
in the last decade, and the society became more authoritarian, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the press is increasingly demonstrating illiberal 
tendencies in the era of illiberal drift.  
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Introduction 
This paper1 focuses on the media representation of political leaders in Croatia, with an aim to 
contextualise the ways in which contemporary political leaders are portrayed in the media in 
reference to their historical representation during periods characterised with higher and lower 
degrees of illiberalism. The key concepts and developments that this study engages with are 
political leadership, media freedom and the authoritarianism of the society, as each has been 
important in recent discussions of the rise of illiberalism in the Central Eastern Europe 
(CEE). Specifically, illiberalism will in this study be examined through three main elements 
that are said to characterise it: centralised leadership (Bermeo 2016; Bustikova and Guasti 
2017; Hajnal 2016), lack of media freedoms (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Puddington 2017), 
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and authoritarianism in society (Shattuck 2016). In line with this, the paper will address 
periods in which a system advances from illiberal to more liberal characteristics through the 
process of democratisation as those experiencing democratic progress, while those in which a 
system gradually regresses from liberal to illiberal characteristics as periods of democratic 
regression, backsliding or illiberal drift2 (Bermeo 2016; Cianetti et al. 2018; Hanley and 
Vachudova 2018; Knott 2018). 
First, this study builds on literature indicating that CEE illiberal democracies are 
characterised by the lack of media freedom. It is argued that the media are often controlled by 
the state, directly through ownership or management, or indirectly through clientelist 
networks of companies and individuals close to the governing elite (Brogi et al. 2017; 
Puddington 2017).  These media outlets usually strongly support the regime in periods of 
growing illiberalism and are as such used as “governmental propaganda machine” (Sadurski 
2018, 47; see also Bustikova and Guasti 2017;). There are numerous examples of political 
pressures on media in CEE countries in the past decade, which range from more subtle 
strategies of political communication, such as refusing to answer journalists’ questions, to 
clear control over media outlets via ownership or regulation (Hanley and Vachudova 2018; 
Knott 2018; Sadurski 2018). For example, Robert Fico, who was the prime minister of 
Slovakia from 2012 to 2018, often refused to engage with journalists who he did not see as 
friendly, while in Czech Republic, the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, who came to power in 
2017, actually owns a considerable share of the Czech media market (Brogi et al. 2017; 
Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Shekhovtson and Sierakowski 2016).  
Furthermore, illiberalism is also said to be manifested as an excessive centralization 
of power. There are formal pathways to achieving concentrated power, which Bermeo (2016) 
discusses under the concept of ‘executive aggrandizement’ (see also Bustikova and Guasti 
2017), but there are also more informal routes in which it is not so much the formal political 
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structures that are leading the process, but rather key political actors and clientelist networks 
among them (Hajnal 2016; Shattuck 2016). This ‘informal’ centralization of power can be 
manifested in an increasing power of political leaders within political structures, such as 
parties and governments, but also in the ability of the key political actors to interfere in the 
electoral and other democratic processes and the judiciary (Bieber 2018; Dzihic n.d.; 
Markowski 2015). The process is often also discussed in literature as one aspect of the 
personalisation of politics, a concept which suggests individuals have increased power and 
visibility, often at the expense of institutions they represent and/or lead (Langer 2011; 
McAllister 2007; Poguntke and Webb 2005). CEE countries are considered to be particularly 
vulnerable to these developments due to their often underdeveloped and weak institutions, 
which may be unable to prevent the centralisation of power and interferences in liberal 
processes (Bugarič and Ginsburg 2016).  
Arguably, in countries where the political elite has a strong hold over the media and 
there is a lack of civil liberties, there is also insufficient transparency about political 
processes due to which citizens are cut off from knowledge about the activities of those who 
exercise real power (Markowski 2015). This might make it easier for the political elites to 
manipulate with the views of citizens and create support for the new, centralised leadership 
style. It can be argued that CEE societies may be particularly susceptible to accepting strong 
leaders as a better option to leadership than democratic structures, as there is evidence that 
authoritarianism, usually considered to be characterized by a preference for strong leaders 
and uncritical submission to a superior, but at the same time exercise of power over one’s 
subordinate (Šiber 2007), has a long tradition in this region. Šiber (2007, 148) argues, 
drawing on the findings from a comparative study of personal attitudes in the communist and 
Western societies, that people who were living in European communist societies expressed 
higher levels of authoritarianism in their uncritical acceptance of authority than those in the 
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West. While there is evidence to suggest that the degree of authoritarianism in the majority of 
CEE societies decreased during the democratisation process, as visible in the support for 
political systems that de-centralise power, change of executives with elections, and exercise 
of a range of civil and political rights (Freedom House 2018), there are indications that some 
CEE societies have again grew more authoritarian in the past few years (Cianetti et al. 2018). 
This is evidenced in the rise of support for illiberal structures and strong leaders, intolerance 
towards minorities and the rise of nationalism, particularly among those who consider 
democracy to have failed them in the light of the financial crisis that hit the region in 2009 
(Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Shattuck 2016).  
The aim of this study is to examine how media, as a political mediator and the main 
source of information for citizens, reports about the most powerful political actors in a CEE 
country during the most recent period arguably characterised by an illiberal drift, and how 
this representation differs, if at all, from previous periods in which a country experienced 
different degrees of centralisation of power, media freedom and authoritarianism. In other 
words, the study draws on the concept of personalised politics, and one of its aspects in 
particular – personalized media reporting, and examines how, if at all, it may be used as an 
indicator of illiberalism. The findings will help us understand what decreased media freedom 
means in practice – in media content, the type of information about power holders that 
citizens have access to and how similar or different current state of suggested illiberalism is 
to previous periods of illiberalism and liberalism, or rather, democratic backsliding and 
democratic progress. The issue is examined in the context of Croatia, the newest Member 
State of the European Union and a CEE country that never achieved full democratic potential. 
The following chapter discusses the practice of political leadership in the CEE region in more 
detail, focusing in particular on the concept of centralised and personalised politics, before 
providing more contextual information about Croatia as the object of study.  
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Political leadership in Central Eastern Europe: Individuals vs institutions? 
 The concept of personalised politics, i.e. politics characterised by political actors, 
media and voters’ focus on individual politicians, and particularly political leaders, rather 
than political institutions and collectives, has been widely discussed and researched, albeit 
mostly in the context of established, Western democracies (e.g. Maier and Adam 2010; 
Poguntke and Webb 2005; de Vreese, Esser and Hopmann 2017). The discussion of the 
implications of personalised politics in the Western context has shown that the main issues of 
concern are unbalanced distribution of power, weakening of political parties, and irrationality 
of voters’ choices (Langer 2011; Poguntke and Webb 2005). The challenging of institutional 
checks and balances is a serious concern of personalised politics in Central Eastern Europe 
too. However, the main potential effects in this context seem to relate to the development of 
democratic institutions, including media, and the institutionalisation of party systems.  
Writing about the early democratisation period, Schöpflin (1993, 268) nicely captures 
the centrality of political leaders by explaining that “almost hypnotically, people turned to 
personalities, virtually without regard to their political programmes, as a repository for 
society’s hopes and desires in particular, because persons were felt to be more reliable, more 
authentic and thus more likely to embody what the individual wanted.” Research into the 
levels of trust that citizens in early post-communist societies put in different political actors 
and institutions confirms this thesis, showing that citizens in nine examined post-communist 
countries tended to trust political leaders more than institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997).  
Furthermore, it seems that the political processes were also revolving around individuals 
given that party leaders are said to have dominated over their parties in this period, 
contributing to under-institutionalised party systems (King 2002; Lewis 2000). Mainwaring 
(1999) describes weakly institutionalized party systems as those in which politics is 
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dominated by individuals, not parties; levels of party identification are low; voters’ volatility 
is high and person-centred voting is more common than the one based on parties and issues. 
All these features are usually ascribed to early post-communist party systems (Colton 2002; 
Kitschelt 1995; Lewis 2000; O’Dwyer and Kovalčik 2005). Parties centred on their leaders 
are less likely to support the development of programmatic party competition which is 
favoured by the advocates of party democracies. Rather, these parties are often charismatic or 
clientelist and favour patronage-oriented politics (Kitschelt 1995), often putting leaders at the 
centre of their activities and communication efforts.  
These patronage-oriented politics have often led to the rise of massive state 
bureaucracies. Clientelist and charismatic parties, once in power, have tended to return the 
favour to their supporters by employing them in state institutions and in this way 
strengthening their clientelist networks. This leads to ineffective governance and state 
bureaucracy since most of the employed are not qualified for positions they have gotten 
(O’Dwyer 2004). Another problem with these practices is that they result in the weakening of 
mechanisms of democratic accountability. Given that the parties and their leaders can win 
elections and exercise power by relying on informal practices, such as corruption and 
clientelism, their accountability to voters is weakened (Ledeneva 2006; Mainwaring 1999). 
Also, strong party leaders tended to rule their parties in an authoritarian style, silencing 
opposition voices and centralizing the decision-making processes (Kasapović 2001; Lewis 
2000). This was particularly evident in the Western Balkan leadership, with Croatia’s Franjo 
Tuđman and Yugoslavia's Slobodan Milošević rule in the 1990s (Bieber 2018). While 
institutions arguably grew stronger in later stages of the democratisation across CEE (Fagan 
and Kopecky 2018; Magone 2015), there seems to be no shortage of strong leaders who 
position themselves above political institutions since the 1990s. Examples include Hungary’s 
Viktor Orban (Bugarič and Ginsburg 2016; Shattuck 2016), Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski 
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(Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Puddington 2017; Sadurski 2018), Slovakia’s Robert Fico 
(Rupnik 2016) and Croatia’s Ivo Sanader (Nikić Čakar 2009). 
 
Political leaders and media  
What are the consequences of personalised politics, and particularly democratic systems 
dominated by strong leaders, on the media as an political communication actor? The link is 
unclear, and rarely discussed in both theoretical and empirical terms. There are indications, 
though, that in democratic systems that see a rise of a strong leader, the media suffers 
consequences. Specifically, according to the Freedom House (2018), there is clear evidence 
that the freedom of the media decreased during tenure of those CEE political leaders who are 
considered to have ruled, or still do, with illiberal values and practices, such as those 
mentioned above. Hungary’s media went from being free to partly free since Orban came to 
power. The same can be observed in Poland since PiS, ruled by Kaczynski, won 
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2015. Similarly, media freedom in Slovakia 
deteriorated while Fico was in power (2012-2018), and in Croatia there was a clear decline in 
media freedom during the tenure of Ivo Sanader in the 2000s.  
Whether it is the leaders themselves that drive these changes, or the institutions they 
head and/or clientelist networks that surround them, the practices they have at their disposal 
to try to influence and perhaps ultimately control the media seem to differ based on the type 
of the media system in which they operate. A useful media system categorisation for mapping 
these practices is that offered by Dobek Ostrowska (2015), who suggests that CEE countries 
who have entered the European Union can be classified as either members of the Hybrid 
Liberal or Politicised Media model. She classifies countries such as Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovakia in the Hybrid liberal model, in which the media are mostly free, their 
politicisation is weak, and the media system is characterised by foreign ownership whose 
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goal seems to be set on economic, rather than political gain. Given this, it is not surprising 
that the political actors aiming to tame the media need to resort to direct actions, such as 
introduction of new legislation, in order to be able to achieve their goals. Examples may be 
the changes to the public service media legislation (Hinsey 2016; Sadurski 2018) and the 
proposals for restriction of foreign media ownership (Puddington 2017; Sadurski 2018) in 
Poland. Political actors in the Politicised Media model can be more subtle in weakening 
critical press, as they can draw on clientelist networks in this process. It is suggested that in 
countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Croatia, where the media are not fully 
free, there is a high degree of politicisation and political parallelism, lack of transparency in 
media ownership, and widespread clientelist relationships among political, economic and 
media elites (Dobek Ostrowska 2015). Arguably, in this kind of a media system, political 
actors that aim to secure favourable coverage can do so through informal networks and 
pressures, as was observed in Croatia when it was revealed that the former PM Ivo Sanader 
planned to control the media by siphoning state advertising to “obedient media houses” 
(Biočina 2010).  No matter the strategies at hand, one thing may be speculated to be common 
to systems with illiberal tendencies and strong leaders – the aim to decrease the amount of 
critical reporting about the leader and increase favourable coverage.  
Indeed, if a country is experiencing democratic backsliding or an illiberal drift (it is 
assumed it reached a state of ‘liberal democracy’ or else it would not have become a Member 
State of the EU), certain changes in how political leaders are represented in the media can be 
expected. Increase in the society’s authoritarianism, centralisation of power, and stronger 
control of media should result in a different media portrayal of political leaders as central 
figures in this system. For example, it may be expected that media will focus more on 
political leaders as individuals if the power is centralised, given such leaders are the most 
important decision-makers in a society, making reporting more personalised. However, 
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personalised media reporting is a key feature of contemporary political journalism (de Vreese 
et al. 2017), and it is quite possible that this type of reporting develops in modern time 
regardless of the illiberal drift. Hence, observing only the level of prominence of political 
leaders in the media reporting is insufficient, and this indicator should be examined in 
relation to a more nuanced evidence related to the portrayal of leaders which may be better 
suited to suggest how media under political pressure reacts in a period of illiberal drift. 
Accordingly, it can also be hypothesised that the media in less liberal periods, or those 
experiencing illiberal drift, scrutinises political leaders less, and, in general, reports more 
positively about them if they are acting in a deferential manner (Dzihic n.d., Markowski 
2015; Sadurski 2018). It could also be expected that this kind of deferential media focuses 
less on leaders’ private lives, as is usually the case in deferential journalistic cultures (Stanyer 
and Wring 2004).  
There is little empirical evidence confirming if any of these practices are taking place. 
This research was set to fill this gap by examining the similarities and difference in how 
political leaders are represented in the media in different periods of democratisation, that is, 
analysing how, if at all,  leaders’ portrayal differ between periods characterised with more 
illiberalism and those with more liberal tendencies. To do this, four main research questions 
about leaders’ portrayal in the media have been asked.  
RQ1: Does the media focus more on political leaders in periods characterised with more 
illiberalism than in those with more liberal tendencies? 
RQ2: Does the media report political leaders with less transparency, that is, reports less about 
what they do, what kind of skills and qualities they have etc., in periods characterised with 
more illiberal tendencies? 
RQ3: Does the media report less about leaders’ private lives and qualities in periods 
characterised with more illiberal tendencies? 
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RQ3: Does the media report political leaders more positively in periods characterised with 
more illiberal tendencies? 
The questions are examined in the context of Croatia, the newest Member State of the 
European Union and a CEE country that, as will be argued in the chapter below, never 
achieved full democratic potential. 
 
Croatia – drifting between illiberalism and liberalism 
Croatia declared independence from SFR Yugoslavia in 1991, following which a war 
escalated which lasted until 1995. Given the military conflict, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the country was throughout 1990s ruled in, as some say, an authoritarian way, with the 
political system focused on the head of the executive, President Franjo Tuđman. Unlike many 
CEE countries which opted for parliamentary systems that would diffuse and de-centralise 
political power in the early period of democratisation, Croatia showed preference for 
institutional arrangements which increase the focus on individual political actors (Easter 
1997), which gave President Tuđman extensive powers in this young democracy. Jović and 
Lamont (2010, 1613) succinctly captured Tuđman's domination over Croatia in 1990s by 
stating that “not only did Franjo Tuđman effectively control all state institutions and 
organisations, but he intervened in civil society, kept the media under firm control, and even 
shaped popular culture”. Accordingly, reporting in the 1990s is considered to have been 
heavily shaped by political pressures (Malović 2004; Peruško 2013), while research into 
personalized reporting during this period confirms that the President was as an individual 
political actor more media visible than his party as an institutional actor, indicating that the 
reporting was quite personalized (Šimunjak 2018). Overall, while there is some evidence of 
democratic progress relative to the preceding period of communism, this first period of 
Croatian history can be described as quite illiberal.  
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In the second decade following the transition, Croatia introduced institutional 
arrangements which decreased the degree of personalized power (Ilišin 2001) and the indexes 
of press freedom showed that the country’s media moved towards being more autonomous 
(Freedom House 2018). The 2000s were marked by Croatia’s negotiations to enter the EU, 
and it was evident that major efforts have been made in this period to increase political rights, 
civil liberties and media freedom (Cianetti et al. 2018, Švob-Đokić et al. 2011). While 
analysis of electoral campaigns suggests that politicians continued to practice a personalised 
approach to politics, putting individuals at the centre of political processes (Grbeša 2008), 
research into media reporting shows that the media put more focus on political institutions 
than individual politicians in this period, indicating de-centralisation of power in the country 
(Šimunjak 2018). Given relevant indicators, this period in Croatian democratisation can be 
considered as one characterised with democratic progress, as it is significantly more liberal 
than the early democratisation period in the 1990s (Bieber 2018; Radeljić 2013).  
Even though 2000s seem to have been more liberal than other periods of Croatian 
history, there is evidence to suggest that Croatian society has in this period started growing 
more authoritarian. University of Zagreb run election surveys before every parliamentary 
election until 2011, with one variable aiming to grasp the degree of authoritarianism among 
the electorate – the question of whether a citizen prefers a strong leader or democracy in 
tough times. The data3 suggests that at all times since Croatia became a democracy there was 
at least a fifth of the electorate that was more in favour of strong leaders. Also, data shows 
that the electorate is increasingly authoritarian, with a trajectory leading to what could be 
considered pre-democratic values.  
Furthermore, several liberal standards started to deteriorate as soon as Croatia secured 
its accession to the EU. While the degree of political and civil rights seemed to have 
remained consistently high since the accession in 2013, relative to the previous decade, the 
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society grew more authoritarian in the 2010s, as evidenced in the civil society’s initiatives to 
curb civil and political rights of certain groups in the society4, and the degree of media 
freedom decreased (Freedom House 2018). With regards to the political context, Rupnik 
(2016, 79) declared that Croatia “confirms the illiberal drift in the region” based on the 
observation of the 2016 conservative-nationalist government, which has been “purging public 
media and cultural institutions while cutting funding for independent media and civil society 
groups” (Rupnik 2016, 79). However, interestingly, based on Freedom House (2018), 
Croatia’s political rights and civil liberties have been consistently rated at 1.5 out of 7 (lower 
scores mean more freedom) since 2010. This is the best score Croatia ever had, as unlike 
countries like Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary 
until 2012, it never scored the overall lowest score of 1 which would indicate full political 
rights and civil liberties5.  
Similarly, Croatian media were never considered to be fully free by the Freedom 
House (2018). The best score its media freedom received was in 2002-03, but even then, it 
was only on the verge of being declared free, still falling into the ‘partly free’ category. Since 
then, the degree of the media freedom has deteriorated, particularly in the past decade. This 
places Croatia in the company of other CEE countries that are members of the EU, but whose 
media have not been considered fully free in the most recent years, like Poland, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Romania. Of these, only Romanian media, like Croatian, were never in the past 
considered fully free.  
It could be speculated that audiences might see media classified as partly free, and 
discussed in terms of increasing political influence, as a not particularly trustworthy source of 
information. Given this, it is interesting to note that, according to the Eurobarometer data 
(2012-20176) from the past five years, the trust in all mediums but TV has been growing 
steadily since the Croatian entry into the EU. Hence, in spite of the decline of media freedom, 
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Croatian audiences’ trust in it has increased. The trust in television has been hit most in this 
era of illiberal drift, which doesn’t surprise given the pressures that the 2016 government 
exerted on the PSM7. Curiously, the medium that gained most in terms of trustworthiness in 
the same period is the written press, which is also considered to be least regulated and 
controlled and in large part in foreign ownership (AZTN 2017; Bilić et al. 2017). 
Consequently, it can be suggested that in times of increased illiberalism audiences have 
decided to put their trust in media that is least perceived to be under political influence. 
Croatian media have also been considered in the past decade as quite liberal in terms of issues 
they have supported and ways in which they have reported about some of the illiberal 
elements in the society8. Hence, although media seem to be facing increased political 
pressures in the 2010s as compared to the 2000s, they are still considerably freer than was the 
case in the illiberal period of the 1990s. Hence, it can be argued that the 2010s represent a 
period of democractic backsliding or illiberal drift, as this period is more illiberal than were 
the 2000s, but the illiberal tendencies observed in most recent times differ significantly from 
illiberal processes taking place in the early period of democratisation (Bieber 2018).  
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Figure 1. The degree of authoritarianism in the society, presented as a % of citizens preferring strong leaders to 
democracy (source: University of Zagreb’s election surveys); freedom of the press scores (FOTP), adapted to a 
0-100% scale where higher numbers represent more media freedom (source: Freedom House); and the freedom 
in the world score depicting the degree of political rights and civil liberties (FIW), adapted to a 0-100% scale 
where higher numbers represent more freedom (source: Freedom House).  
 
In line with the outlined research questions, this study will examine what kind of 
similarities and differences exist in Croatian leaders’ portrayal between current era dubbed as 
a period of ‘illiberal drift’ with a period of ‘liberal democracy’ in 2000s and ‘illiberal 
democracy’ found in the early democratisation era.  
 
Research design 
In order to answer research questions, a longitudinal content analysis of main Croatian daily 
newspapers was conducted in the period from 1990, when Croatia declared independence 
from Yugoslavia, to 2018. Given that the aim of this analysis was to determine trends over 
time in leaders’ media representation, quantitative content analysis was a logical choice since 
it is the method most suited to detecting the frequency of references to certain content and 
identifying recurrent patterns (Deacon 2007; Berger 2011). Also, it was important to use a 
method which would allow certain generalizations from the data, and content analysis is 
considered to be the best quantitative textual method that allows for generalized conclusions 
(Hesmondalgh 2006; Berger 2011). It should also be noted that the findings from this study 
are based on the manifest meaning of media text, since content analysis is not well suited to 
the analysis of latent, hidden meanings (Hesmondalgh 2006). In addition, given that content 
analysis is limited to providing descriptive information about media texts, this study will not 
be able to reveal why the media reported in a particular way, that is, it will not be able to 
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reveal their intentions, nor how the audiences received the messages from the media  (Berger 
2011). 
 The analysis covers a time frame from 1990 to 2018, providing data for all Croatian 
political leaders who were heads of the executive and stayed in office for more than three 
years. In total, the analysis includes one President (Franjo Tuđman) and five Prime Ministers 
(Ivica Račan, Ivo Sanader, Jadranka Kosor, Zoran Milanović and Andrej Plenković). Croatia 
had a semi-presidential political system in the 1990s in which the President was considered 
the head of the executive, so their representation was analysed (Ilišin 2001). Since 2000, 
Croatia has had a parliamentary political system and according to the Constitution the head 
executive is the Prime Minister, so the analysis focuses on them since this point in time. 
 
Material 
The material of analysis are national daily newspapers, as the only relevant mass medium that 
is readily available throughout the examined period. Although Croatian audiences in recent 
times mainly rely on online media and television for news (Newman 2018), online media was 
not a viable material for analysis as it hasn’t been present in the early democratisation period, 
while the choice of television would limit the source to one media outlet in the 1990s as the 
television market was only deregulated at the end of this decade. Consequently, daily 
newspapers, which notably are the medium that have gained most trust of Croatian audiences 
in the past decade, have been chosen as the material of analysis.  
The main material for this analysis is the national daily newspaper Večernji list, which 
is the only existing mass media outlet that dates back to 1990 with a full archive that is 
readily available. Editions of Večernji list are taken as a main source and included in analyses 
of coverage of every head of the executive. Two other dailies are used to supplement the 
findings from the Večernji list. The first one is Vjesnik which ceased publication in April 
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2012 so it was not used for the analysis of Plenković’s media portrayal. The other is 24sata 
which was established in 2005, so it was used for analyses of Kosor, Josipović, Milanović 
and Plenković. Therefore, there are at least two sources used in the analysis of every head of 
the executive’s coverage with an aim to avoid relying on only one source, to increase the 
validity of findings, and enhance the ability to generalize.  
These three dailies represent an interesting mix of different types of daily newspapers 
operating in the Croatian print media market. Vjesnik was established as a communist 
publication and was not privatized in the democratic era (Novak 2005). Therefore, it is an 
excellent example of a state-owned media. Also, in the commercial media market of 
democratic Croatia it was considered to be the daily that was closest to being a quality paper 
(Jergović 2004). Večernji list was privatized at the end of 1990s and can be seen as a 
representative of a daily that was transformed from a state-owned to a commercial daily 
(Malović 2004; Tuđen 2007). Also, according to its content and format, it is usually 
characterized as a semi-tabloid (Kanižaj 2006). Therefore, its ownership, content and format 
are different from Vjesnik’s. Finally, 24sata is considered to be the only real tabloid in the 
Croatian market (Car and Andrijašević 2012). It was established and is still owned by a 
private media conglomerate (ibid.). Therefore, 24sata represents a third type of daily in the 
Croatian newspaper market: a daily established in a democracy, by private owners, with 
tabloid characteristics. It has been the most read daily newspapers in Croatia ever since it 
started publication.  
 
Sample 
The unit of analysis is an article, defined as a totality of words, pictures and illustrations that 
form an independent part of a newspaper and whose elements usually revolve around the 
same topic. The sample includes every article that referred to each of the heads of the 
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executive (either by name or post) in the week preceding their election/appointment to office, 
and any article that mentioned them during two weeks in March spread across their second 
and third year in office. The aim was to obtain a sample of articles that was representative of 
both the intense political coverage and the ‘normal’ coverage, and also to be as comparable as 
possible. Therefore, the first week of analysis aims to capture intense coverage and is usually 
the one preceding the election in which the head of the executive came to power. However, in 
one case (Jadranka Kosor) the leader came to power by appointment, so the first analysed 
week is the one preceding appointment. That is the period of the most intense coverage of the 
leader and in that way comparable with campaign coverage. In order to find articles 
representative of ‘normal’ periods, the focus was put on March coverage since it is the only 
month in which there were no elections (presidential, parliamentary, local or European) 
throughout the examined period. Also, the focus is on either the first or the second week in 
March to avoid the Easter holidays.  
Exception was made in cases of Franjo Tuđman whose first year in office was not 
included in the analysis. Tuđman acted as the President of Croatia since 1990, but Croatia did 
not formally declare independence until 1991, so the 1992 presidential elections can be seen 
as the first formal elections in the independent state. Therefore, the last week of the 1992 
presidential campaign has been included as representative of Tuđman’s first year in office. 
 
Coding sheet 
In order to establish leaders' visibility, the number of articles mentioning the leader has been 
compared to the total number of articles published in the timeframe of analysis for a 
particular leader. It is presented as a percentage of all published articles. Furthermore, the 
analysis introduced the concept of a leader's persona. Drawing on Corner (2000), “persona” is 
in this project primarily understood as a person’s perceived personality, a politician’s image 
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as it is presented in the public sphere. Hence, for the reference to a leader to also be a 
reference to his/her persona, some part of a leader’s personality, life or qualities, must be 
mentioned. In other words, only those references to a leader which mention him/her in 
relation to something he/she does or fails to do, thinks, says, how he/she is, which skills 
he/she has, are considered to be references to a leader’s persona. Consequently, persona-
centred reporting is presented as a percentage of all articles that mentioned the political 
leader, that also mentioned his/her personae. 
In order to establish the context in which a leader was mentioned, each article in 
which a leader’s persona was mentioned was examined for the pre-dominant context in which 
it was mentioned. Three main values were offered: political, private and political/private 
(mixed) context. These distinctions were based on the differences between private and 
political persona as suggested by Corner (2000), Van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer (2011) and 
van Zoonen and Holtz-Bacha (2000). If the features of a leader’s persona were mentioned 
pre-dominantly in relation to him/her as a person who is performing a political role, the 
political context value was to be chosen. If they were mentioned pre-dominantly in relation to 
a leader as a person performing roles that are usually associated with the private sphere 
(father, spouse, sports enthusiast etc.), the private context value was to be chosen. Finally, if 
the article referred equally to the features of a leader’s persona in both contexts, and/or it 
made explicit connections between a leader’s political and private persona, the value 
political/private was offered. In order to establish evaluative comment of a leader's persona, 
reference to it was coded as pre-dominantly positive, negative or neutral. Specifically, if a 
leader or his actions were not evaluated or there was both criticism and endorsement, the 
article was coded as neutral. If the leader was pre-dominantly praised, it was coded as 
positive. If he/she was mostly criticized, it was coded as negative. 
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Overall, 44.030 articles have been examined in the study, of which a final sample of 
1638 articles, those in which a head of the executive has been mentioned, have been studied 
in detail. Inter-coder reliability test was conducted with another coder who coded 200 
randomly chosen articles (12.2% of the sample). Average reliability score calculated using 
Holsti’s method of agreement across main categories was 0.96, with individual variable 
scores ranging from 0.82 to 1.  
 
Findings 
RQ1- Leaders’ mediated visibility increases in more illiberal periods.  
Daily newspapers report about current PM Plenković twice as much as they did about 
Milanović in early 2010s, and in equal measure as they did about the 1990s President 
Tuđman. This would indicate that the media prominence of main political actors in the 
society has returned to the levels observed in more illiberal periods of Croatian history. 
However, before jumping to conclusions about what this means in terms of the position of 
political leaders in Croatia, it is important to examine the nature of this increased coverage. 
Specifically, it is important to examine what kind of information is being reported about 
political leaders and what is the tone of this coverage.  
 
Figure 2. Percentage of all articles mentioning a head of the executive. N = 44.030 
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RQ2 – Leaders’ personae are not less visible is more illiberal periods.  
When media mention political leaders, do they report about their personae, i.e. what they do, 
how they feel and what kind of people they are? The data suggests that there are no drastic 
differences between the amount of information media reported about political leaders as 
individuals since the 1990s. However, there is a weak positive trend evident over time. This 
means that the public has over time received increasing amount of information about political 
leaders as individuals, i.e. who they are and what they do, with most information about them 
available in the public discourse in the most recent period. Hence, most recent reporting 
seems to offer most transparency about political leaders' activities and qualities. When this 
information is coupled with the data related to RQ1, it could be suggested that in the current 
period in which Croatian society is exhibiting certain illiberal tendencies, the media puts 
more focus on political leaders than it did in periods characterised with less illiberalism, and 
this higher visibility serves to increase transparency in political leaders’ activities.  
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of all articles mentioning a head of the executive that contain a reference to his/her 
persona. N = 1.638 
 
RQ3 – Leaders’ private personae are equally visible in all periods.  
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Data shows that current PM Plenković’s persona, as all others, is mainly presented in a 
political context. His private persona has been politicised more than that of any other of his 
predecessors, but this has still been done on a very rare occasion (5% of all articles that 
mention his persona), while articles focusing primarily on his private life are extremely 
uncommon, as was also the case in the past. Hence, it can be concluded that there are no 
significant differences in the extent to which media are willing to report leaders’ private 
matters between what can be considered more and less liberal periods since 1990, suggesting 
a consistency in the style of reporting political leaders’ personae.  
The glimpses into the private lives of political leaders in the post-communist period 
show that the media is allowed to report leaders’ private lives, albeit there is a reluctance in 
pursuing more forcefully this style of reporting. Croatian media’s lack of willingness to 
report private lives of political leaders seem to be more in line with values of journalistic 
cultures characteristic of Mediterranean countries, where this type of information is not 
considered appropriate to be reported by the media itself (Stanyer and Wring 2004).  
 
 
Figure 4. Structure of references to a leader's persona presented as percentage of all articles mentioning a head 




Perhaps more importantly for the topic pursued in this article, this finding suggests that the 
increased reporting about the head of the executive in the most current period not only 
focuses on leaders’ activities and qualities, but also mostly to those related to their political 
functions. This would mean that the public is receiving more information about what their 
leaders do in their political roles than was the case in periods characterised with less illiberal 
tendencies. Arguably, this should increase transparency in political processes and activities.  
 
RQ4 – Media are not less critical of leaders in more recent illiberal periods.  
The findings related to RQ1-3 are, in itself, insufficient to suggest that the print media is 
trying to hold political leaders to account in the most recent period of Croatian 
democratisation. It would be plausible that the media has increased their focus on political 
activities of heads of the executives, but only to glorify them and help build their cult, as was 
the case in communism and in some countries, also in the early post-communist period. In 
order to establish whether the media is really aiming to scrutinise political leaders and 
increase transparency in the political processes, it is essential to examine the tone of 
newspaper coverage. Here, the data and trends over time are quite clear - most recent heads 
of the executive have been portrayed more negatively and less positively than any other 
leaders before them. There is a clear trend towards more critical media reporting over time 
and there is no indication that this trend is being reversed in the recent period characterised 
with increased illiberal tendencies.  
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Figure 5. Evaluative comment of a leader’s persona presented as a percentage of all articles mentioning a head 
of the executive’s persona (n.b. ‘neutral’ variable not presented). N = 1.259 
 
Discussion & Conclusions 
Even though there is evidence that media is under more political pressure now than it was a 
decade ago, the degree of civil liberties is stagnating, and the electorate is increasingly 
authoritarian, most expectations of the conduct of media in this context have not been met. 
Leaders visibility in the media has increased from what might be considered a more liberal 
period and matches that observed in the early illiberal period. However, with more articles 
mentioning heads of the executive in the most current period of democratisation, there is 
increased amount of information about leaders’ activities and qualities in the public 
discourse, which can arguably increase the transparency of political and decision-making 
processes. Perhaps even more importantly, the print media, which is consistently gaining trust 
of its audience, is most critical of political leaders than it ever was since the beginning of the 
democratisation period, even more than in the more liberal period of democratisation. And 
finally, while the portrayal of political leaders remains within the constraints of the political 
context, there is no evidence to suggest that the media is more deferential now than it was in 
the more liberal period. 
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These findings have several important implications. In the first place, more caution 
should be employed when making claims about the ‘illiberalism’ in the CEE, as the evidence 
from this study suggests that the illiberal drift observed in the past decade has some 
significant differences to other periods characterised with illiberal elements in the past. For 
one, while we can see that the indexes of media freedom show that the situation in the region 
is increasingly problematic, the Croatian case shows that this does not easily translate into 
less critical and more deferential media reporting which would serve the ruling political elite, 
as it did in the early democratisation period. Instead, there are significant differences in how 
media portrays the most powerful political actors in the era of illiberalism in the first post-
communist period and the current era of illiberal drift. Most notably, in spite of the illiberal 
drift and pressures that some other media outlets in the country are experiencing (particularly 
PSM), the print media seems to show a certain resilience to political pressures as it 
continuously increases the scrutiny with which they report heads of the executive. This also 
indicates that traditional definitions of illiberalism may need rethinking, as it appears there 
may well currently be different forms of illiberalism across CEE. It was not in the scope of 
this study to establish these, but findings do suggest there is a need for further examination of 
the illiberalism in the region from the perspective of media, and especially journalistic 
reporting, as journalistic output is rarely examined in detail.   
Indeed, this study reveals that more caution is needed in making assumptions about 
how media output, and consequently information available to citizens in the mediated public 
discourse, is affected by changes in the overall media freedom. It is sometimes assumed that 
less media freedom, as observed through various indices, means more political control over 
media content and less criticality in how political actors and processes are mediated (e.g. 
Dzihic n.d.). However, the Croatian case suggests that while this may be true for some, more 
exposed and politically vulnerable media outlets, such as PSM and media subsidized by 
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various government schemes, this is not necessarily true for the entire media system, as was 
the case in the democratic periods prior to privatisation and commercialisation of the media 
sector (Gross 2004; Bajomi-Lazar 2013; Gulyas 2003). While clientelist relationships 
between media owners and political elites are not uncommon in the region (Dobek Ostrowska 
2015), this case study suggests that important national media actors can continue in times of 
an illiberal drift with practices they have developed in more liberal periods – increasing 
transparency in political processes and holding powerful to account. It was beyond the scope 
of this study to establish the factors driving these trends and practices in Croatia, but it is 
worth examining them in reference to journalistic roles and related trust in media, and media 
ownership. 
First, it appears this kind of approach to political reporting in times of an illiberal drift 
pays off. The audiences can be seen to reward the media that continue to perform their 
watchdog functions by increased trust in the content they produce. It has been argued that 
digital media in some CEE countries have been able to continue with objective and critical 
reporting in spite of the increased pressures (Shattuck 2016), but it is important to note that 
the same is true in some countries, like Croatia, also for certain traditional media, like the 
print. Croatian audiences’ trust in digital media grew over the past five years as well, but the 
sector that gained most trust in this period is the press (Eurobarometer 2012-179). This is 
quite important for a media sector that is in decline (Newman 2018), as the increased trust 
and watchdog positioning could help rejuvenate the sector and give it new importance and 
meaning. It is also important for CEE media in general to acknowledge that perseverance in 
critical political reporting and pursuit of investigative reporting are valued by audiences and 
can allow media not only to perform the role of holding powerful to account (Allan 2010), 
but also regain some of their importance in the society, which, it has been argued, has been 
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diminishing with the proliferation of digital technologies (Splichal and Dahlgren 2016; 
Charles 2014) and changes to political economies of media around the world (Street 2011).  
 Second, it is important to note that newspapers analysed in this study reported most 
critically in periods when they were owned by private and foreign entities. There are obvious 
concerns in countries such as Czech Republic and Romania where politicians own significant 
shares of the media market and there are pressures on the PSM (Shekhovtson and 
Sierakowski 2016; Puddington 2017), and so far less focus is put on the role that the private 
media is playing in the media market characterised with increased political pressures. As this 
case study shows, private media, and particularly those in foreign ownership, may be key to 
maintaining the scrutiny over political processes in CEE countries experiencing illiberal 
drifts. Ruling political elites seem to be aware of this, as there are attempts to put pressure on 
independent media through the reduction of state advertising (Shekhovtson and Sierakowski 
2016; Brogi et al. 2017) and foreign media ownership (Puddington 2017). The findings of 
this analysis demonstrate how important in practice are private and foreign-owned media 
outlets in holding political elites to account, which suggests that more focus should be put on 
the monitoring and protection of their political independence in countries that are 
experiencing illiberal drifts.  
 Potential connections between critical press, their ownership and audiences outlined 
above are obviously at this point only speculations which can be used to form further 
hypotheses that can be tested in some future research. As the study was based on a textual 
analysis, it does not allow making inferences about correlations or causations with other 
variables. Another important limitation of this study is the fact that it is a case study and 
hence its findings are not generalisable across the CEE region. However, the case study 
allowed us to test some initial assumptions about how the media content can be used to 
reflect, or rather react to, illiberal elements in different periods of democratisation, and as 
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such, it provided evidence that enables us to start questioning some of the theories about the 
media behaviour in contexts considered to be experiencing illiberal drifts. Future research 
could examine whether the trends observed in this case study can be observed across the 
region, or at least in similar contexts, which factors drive specific media behaviour in 
different forms of illiberalism, and also what kind of consequences critical reporting in times 
of illiberal drift has on the relationship between citizens and political elites – particularly on 
the trust in institutions and the susceptibility to populist appeals.  
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